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From  the  early  1600s,  when  tobacco  exports  the  U.S.  and  the Soviet  Union,  the  two nuclear
literally  saved  the  struggling  Jamestown  settle-  super powers,  has subsided;  and the influence of
ment, to the January  4,  1980, embargo of grain to  the  Third  World,  Japan,  and  OPEC  has  risen.
the  Soviet  Union,  food  and  agriculture  have  Third, not only the degree of U.S. influence,  but
played  varied  roles in international  affairs  of the  the desire  of the  U.S.  to influence  international
U.S., that is, in the political,  military, economic,  economic  affairs  has apparently  diminished,  es-
and  cultural  exchanges  that  affect  the power  of  pecially  since  the  Vietnam  conflict.  Fourth,  in-
the  U.S.  relative  to  other  sovereign  nations.  ternational  economic  problems  have  grown  in
Food  donations  have  been  used  as  a  hu-  scale,  complexity,  and interrelatedness.  It is be-
manitarian gesture  to avert starvation.  Food  ex-  coming increasingly  difficult  to  identify discrete
port  embargoes  have  been  used  as  weapons  problems  and solutions  that  an individual  nation
against  foreign  adversaries  and  domestic  scar-  can resolve.  Fifth, there  is a growing wariness  of
cities.  Food pledges  have  been used to promote  the  increased  national  vulnerability  and  costs  of
international  food aid  conventions.  Food import  increased  international  interdependence.
quotas  have been  reallocated  to reward  friendly  The  decline  in  U.S.  prestige  and  military
nations  and  penalize  unfriendly  ones.  U.S. food  superiority  was  an  issue  during  the  1980  presi-
shipments have been used to feed Allied soldiers  dential  campaign.  Whether  the  U.S.  has the  de-
and  to  barter  for  strategic  materials.  Food  ex-  sire  or  the  capability  to  regain  lost  influence  is
ports  have  been  used  to  bolster  the  domestic  uncertain. The euphoric and patriotic response to
economy  and strengthen  the dollar.  the return of the hostages  from Iran and the pub-
During the  1970s,  four  U.S.  grain  embargoes,  lic  support  of  increased  military  expenditures
rising  real  food  prices,  increased  U.S.  food  ex-  may signal  an increase in the desire  of this coun-
ports,  success  of  OPEC,  massive  U.S.-Soviet  try  to  reassert  itself  in  world  affairs.  Possibly
grain  deals,  severe  food  shortages  in Africa  and  there  will come  the realization  that the last three
southeast  Asia,  and  dwindling  reserve  stocks  decades  of  unprecedented  world  economic  ex-
focused  increased  attention  upon  U.S.  "food  pansion  have  coincided  with  unprecedented
power."  This  paper assesses  the  potential  role  world  trade  (Lewis).  Nevertheless,  it  will not be
and power of food in  the  international  affairs  of  too  surprising  if  the  prominence  of the  U.S.  in
the  U.S.  during  the  1980s.  It is  argued  that  the  international  affairs  further  recedes.  The  center
role  and power of food in future international  af-  of world power has shifted. The predominance  of
fairs of the U.S.  will be dependent upon the posi-  Europe  declined  as  a  result  of colonial  revolu-
tion  and  influence  of the  U.S.  in  international  tions and  the ascendency  of formerly  backward
relations and food affairs;  and the extent of scar-  nations such as Russia and China (Morgenthau).
city or abundance  of food in world markets.
Global  Food  Regime  Challenged
U.S.  POSITION  IN  INTERNATIONAL  Hopkins  and  Puchala  (see  especially  pp.
RELATIONS  AND  FOOD  AFFAIRS  18-25)  argue  that  international  food  affairs  are
governed  by a "global food regime,"  which they
Changing Character of International Relations  define  as  a  set  of rules,  norms,  or institutional
expectations  that  guide  decisions  relating  to  in-
T.  K.  Warley,  a distinguished  Canadian  agri-  ternational  food  transactions.  Hopkins  and
cultural  economist,  has  identified  five  key  as-  Puchala  maintain that the regime  was  U.S.  cen-
pects  of the  changing  character  of international  tered and  U.S. prescribed  from the late  1940s to
relations.  First,  economic  policy  has  replaced  the early  1970s,  and was guided by the following
strategic  balance,  territorial  integrity,  and  ideo-  basic  principles:  (1)  free  trade  in  theory,  with
logical competition  as  the core of foreign  policy.  considerable  deviation  in practice;  (2)  stabiliza-
Second,  there  is  today  more  pluralism  in  world  tion  of international  grain  markets  by  adjust-
political  and  economic  affairs.  The  influence  of  ments  in  the  U.S.  via production  controls,  gov-
Professor of Agricultural  Economics,  Virginia  Tech,  Blacksburg,  Virginia.
Paper prepared  for the  annual  meeting of the Southern  Agricultural  Economics  Association,  Atlanta,  Georgia,  February  3, 1981.
29ernment  stock  accumulation,  foreign  donations,  controls  and thereby force on the world markets
and  market  duopoly with  Canada;  (3)  provision  even  greater  instability  than  otherwise  would
of food aid, but with as much attention to dispos-  have  been  experienced  (Johnson).  Dale  Hatha-
ing  of surpluses,  creating  markets,  and  cultivat-  way,  the  former USDA  Under  Secretary for In-
ing allies as to alleviating global malnutrition; and  ternational  Affairs,  has  implied  that  the  U.S.
(4)  adherence  to  a  philosophy  of  international  needs to take a more active role in grain trade  in
"hands  off"  and  national  sovereignty  in  food  order  to  cope  with  the  Soviets.  But  I  am  ap-
production,  consumption,  and  distribution  mat-  prehensive  of increased  direct U.S.  government
ters.  involvement  in commercial  grain trade.
Hopkins  and  Puchala  contend  that this  set of  If the  meager  results  of the  Tokyo  Round  of
norms was challenged and outmoded by the early  trade  negotiations  and  the apathy relative  to the
1970s.  The  New  International  Economic  Order  1974  World  Food  Conference  recommendations
of the Third World countries,  emboldened by the  are  any  indication,  international  agreements  to
success of OPEC, began to challenge the concept  foster agricultural trade and food security will be
of free trade  and  seek a deliberate  manipulation  slow to materialize  (Callear  and Blandford).  But
of international  terms of trade in their favor. The  the  problems  are  not  insurmountable;  world
Soviet Union and  China, largely absent from  the  unanimity is not required.  As is indicated  below,
international  markets prior to the  1970s,  became  substantial  grain  deficits  could  be  overcome  by
significant influences.  Food aid was criticized for  modest increases  in productivity or grain  prices.
the disincentive  effect it had on production in the  International  grain  price stability  and food  secu-
recipient  countries  and  for its  political  implica-  rity could be achieved  by modest world  grain re-
tions. The U.S.  became  less willing and  able  to  serve  stock levels of 15 to 80 million  metric tons
stabilize  the  international  grain  markets  as  ex-  (Houck  and Ryan, p.  31).  The problems  of grain
ports  boomed  and  stocks  dwindled.  Steps  were  pricing,  contracting,  and  storage  risks  could  be
taken to  establish an international  food  conven-  reduced  by the use of the futures  market (Seev-
tion and improve the multilateral  coordination  of  ers).  Orbiting  satellites  could  increase  crop  re-
food  assistance.  Internationally  sponsored  ag-  porting  accuracy  and  timeliness  and,  thereby,
ricultural  research  institutes  were  established  to  improve the economic efficiency  of market price
expand  food production  in the developing  coun-  signals. In short, there are steps that can be taken
tries  and to  spread the  "green  revolution."  now, without threatening  national sovereignty or
requiring  total  international  agreement,  which
Role  of Markets  could  enhance  the  contribution  of food  and  ag-
riculture  in  international  affairs.  Indeed,  as
It is possible to acknowledge the imperfections  Callear and Blandford  have argued,  it is very un-
of and challenges  to a trade-oriented  world  food  likely  that  international  agricultural  agreement
regime and embrace the need for emergency food  will be possible  unless and until trade liberaliza-
relief,  yet  advocate  strengthening  the  interna-  tion is achieved.
tional  market  mechanism.  Despite  the  frequent
and  disruptive  effects  of  government  involve-
ment,  such  as  the  4  U.S.  grain  embargoes  the  FOOD  POWER
past 8 years and the fickle grain purchases  of the
Soviet Union, world  agricultural trade during the  Food  as an Economic  Weapon
past  30  years  has  grown  by  5.3  percent  annu-
ally-almost  double  the  2.7  percent  growth  in  The  challenges  to  U.S.  influence  in  interna-
world  production  (O'Brien).  Despite  policies  to  tional  affairs,  coupled  with booming  U.S.  grain
protect  domestic  agriculture,  changes  in  grain  exports  and  the  success  of  OPEC,  stimulated
prices are correlated  among major grain  export-  discussion of food as  a weapon or foreign policy
ers, and to a lesser extent among grain importers.  tool.  As  Don  Paarlberg  notes  (p.  1):  "The
Collins found that major grain exporting nations,  thought  has  arisen  that  some  of  the  lost  U.S.
such  as  Australia,  Canada,  Argentina,  and  international  influence  might  be  recaptured
Brazil,  have elasticities  of price transmission for  through  the use of food."
wheat  and  corn  fairly  close  to  one.  Importing  But,  food  is  very  different  from  crude.  First,
countries,  such  as  Japan,  Egypt,  India,  and  only  10 percent  of the world's food is  consumed
Nigeria,  ranged from 0.3 to 0.8.  Also, Thompson  in  countries  other  than  where  it  is  produced,
and  Dahl have  found that weekly  corn  prices  in  whereas  50  percent  of  the  oil  is  consumed  in
the  U.S.  and Rotterdam  markets  are highly  cor-  countries  different  from  where  it  is  produced
related.  (Nau).  A  stoppage  of  oil  exports  would  drasti-
The problem of increasing world market insta-  cally  affect availability  throughout  the  world.  A
bility during  the  1970s  was the result  of reduced  curtailment of food exports would have a modest
grain  stocks  and government policies-the most  impact  upon world  food  supplies.  Second,  it  is
important policy was  the Soviet Union's attempt  essentially  costless to "store"  oil in the ground,
to  achieve  internal price  stability  through  trade  whereas  food is perishable and costly to hold off
30the  market  to  drive  up  prices.  Third,  food  is  a  The  misconception  of  the  potential  for  food
basic  human  need,  and  attempts  to  use  it  as  a  power arises from the belief that a cartel's poten-
diplomatic weapon by withholding it in situations  tial depends  upon  the  share of world exports.  It
where  starvation  might  result  would  be  con-  does  not.  It depends  upon  the  share ofproduc-
demned  by  the world  community.  This  does  not  tion.  A  case  in  point  is  rice.  The  U.S.  is  the
mean  that  food  power  is  negligible,  but  it  does  world's  leading rice exporter,  with  30 percent  of
suggest  that,  politically,  morally,  and  econom-  the  total,  yet it produces  only  2 percent  of total
ically,  food  is  a  considerably  weaker diplomatic  world production:  clearly,  reducing  rice exports
weapon than oil.  would  have  little  influence  upon  world  prices.
Since  U.S.  agricultural  production  has  risen Food  Market Power  via Cartels  more  slowly  than  world  production  during  the
past 30 years, this country's food power has been One measure of the power or leverage of food  declining rather than increasing.
in international  affairs is the potential to increase
export revenues  by  cartel action.  Food  leverage
depends  upon  the  derived  demand  elasticity  of  Food  Power via  Embargoes
exports (Ex).  If the derived demand for exports is
inelastic,  revenues  may be increased  by limiting  In comparison  with  a  cartel,  an embargo  is  a
exports.  The  derived  demand depends  upon the  more  blatant attempt  to wield food power.  Obvi- cartel's  share  of the  world  production  (W),  the  ously,  trade must be  occurring in order for ship-
elasticities  of food  supply  (ESROW),  and  demand  ments  to be stopped.  Assuming that  there are  no
(EdROW)  in the rest of the world (Van Duyne),  that  alternative  sources  of imports for the  adversary
is,  and no  alternative  export outlets for the country
imposing the embargo,  the net social cost (reduc-
Ex  =  EdROW/W  +  (l-W)  EsROW/W.  tion of consumer and producer surplus) imposed
upon  each country  depends  upon  the  square  of If food supply or demand  in the rest of the world  the  share  of the  amount embargoed  (X/Q)2,  the
is  highly elastic,  or if the cartel  controls a small  elasticities  of supply  (Es)  and  demand  (Ed),  and share  of world production,  limiting food  exports  the  equilibrium  value  (PQ)  that  would  prevail will  decrease  the  cartel's  revenues  and  not  without the embargo,'  that is,
greatly  affect world  markets  and  vice versa.
Suppose the U.S. wanted to increase grain  ex-  Net Social Cost  =  .5(X/Q) 2 PQ/(Ed  +  Es). port  revenues  by  forming' a cartel.  If the  grain
supply  and  demand  elasticities  in  the rest of the  The  social cost imposed upon the adversary  will
world  each equal 0.2  in absolute value,  the U.S.  be  higher  (1) the  larger the  relative  amount  em-
would  need  to  control  one-third  of world  grain  bargoed,  (2)  the lower  the absolute  value  of the
production.  To achieve  that,  this  country  would  supply and demand elasticities,  and (3) the higher
have to form  a  cartel with all the  developed  na-  the equilibrium  value.
tions.  If the  supply and demand  elasticities  each  In the case of the recent  Soviet grain embargo,
equal 0.4, the cartel would  need to control three-  I  have  made  some  rough  calculations  using  the
fifths of world production, which is roughly equal  above formula,  which  suggest that the net social
to  all  the  grain  produced  outside  centrally  cost  imposed  upon  the  U.S.  was  $145  million planned countries.  Viewed  from  a different per-  compared  to $470  million imposed  upon  the  So-
spective,  if the U.S.  attains  20 percent  of world  viets,  assuming  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  elasticities
grain  production  (W),  the  rest-of-world  supply  are  equal.2 The point is that an embargo not only
(EsROW),  and  demand  (EdROW),  elasticities  would  inflicts  social  cost upon  the  adversary-it  also
need to be  .1 or smaller in order for the elasticity  penalizes  the  domestic economy  as  well;  and  it
of derived  demand  to  be inelastic.  This  is  much  may in fact,  depending upon the magnitudes  and
lower  than  the  0.2  to  0.4 commonly  used  (U.S.  elasticities,  impose  greater  social  cost upon  the
Department  of Agriculture  1971;  Abbott;  Abel;  domestic  economy  than  upon  the  adversary.
Peterson;  Bredahl  et  al.  Even  if  we  assume  a  Furthermore,  the responsiveness  of the  interna-
price transmission  elasticity of 0.5, rest-of-world  tional  grain  market  or  the  transshipment  black
supply  and  demand  elasticities  less  than  0.2  market appear to render any food  embargo inef-
would be necessary.  Thus, the  U.S.  is not likely  fective  unless accompanied  by a military  block-
to gain food power  by forming  a grain  cartel.  ade.
'The  net  social cost corresponds  to  the area of the triangle  formed,  its apex being the with-embargo  equilibrium  price;  its base  being the horizontal  distance  between  the domestic  supply  and  demand curve  at  the  without-embargo  equilibrium  price.  The formula  is an approximation  to this  area,  assuming  constant elasticities. 2
These  values are based  upon  0.2 supply (E,) and demand  (El)  elasticities  for both  U.S.  and USSR;  17 million  metric tons embargoed  (X): without-embargo  quantities (Q) of 300  million  metric tons in the U.S. and  197 million  metric tons in the  USSR; and  without the embargo  price of $120  per metric ton in  the U.S.  and $160  per metric ton in  the USSR. The grain supply and demand  elasticities of wheat,  rice, and coalrse  grains,  weighted  respectively  by production and consumption  as reported by  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (1971,  pp.  35,  36,  and 43,  44),  are,  for the  U.S.,  0.276  and  0.37;  and  for the  USSR,  0.2  and 0.3.
31WORLD  GRAIN  DEMAND,  SUPPLY  developed  during the second  world war has been
AND  TRADE  PROSPECTS3 exhausted;  (2)  major innovations  are not likely;
(3)  surplus agricultural  labor in developed coun-
Grain Demand  tries has  already  been  absorbed  in industry;  (4)
minerals  and  oil  are  becoming  more  scarce;  (5)
U.S.  food power is most directly linked  to the  consumer  preferences  in  developed  countries
major  grains-wheat,  corn,  and  rice-because  have shifted to services  and away from manufac-
the  U.S.  is  the  world's  leading  grain  exporter;  tures, thereby  dampening industrial demand; and
grains  are  its most important  agricultural export;  (6)  high taxes have  diminished  work and invest-
and  grains  are  important  sources  of  energy  in  ment  incentives  and,  consequently,  growth.
world  diets.  Accordingly,  the  demand,  supply,  Lewis reminds  us  "that the world economy  has
and trade discussion will focus  on grains.  had  long  periods  of prosperity  (like  1850-1873)
Future  demand  growth  for grain  (D*)  (herein  and  long  periods  of relative  stagnation  (say
an asterisk  (*) signifies  annual  growth)  depends  1913-1950),  so that there  is nothing strange in the
upon  population  growth  (N*),  the  income  elas-  idea that the next two or three decades  may turn
ticity  (Ey),  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  (Ed),  out to be difficult"  (p.  15).
real  per  capita  income  growth  (Y*),  and  real  The  World  Bank,  in  agreement  with  Lewis,
grain  price growth  (P*),  that is,  observes  "that world  economic  growth  will  be
sluggish  during  the  next  few  years,  as  oil-
D* =  N*  + EyY*  +  EdP*.  importing countries...  adapt  to  higher  energy
costs" (p.  1).  The World Bank projects a 1980-90
We  will now  briefly  examine  each of these fac-  per capita GNP growth of developed countries in
tors. Since international relations, as well as cur-  the  range  of  2.5  to  3.1  percent,  of  developing
rent  and  prospective  levels  of population,  in-  countries from  2.1  to  2.9 percent,  and  centrally
come,  and prices differ greatly among countries,  planned  countries  at  3.3  percent.  These  figures
countries  have  been  combined  into  familiar  imply  a  world  GNP  per  capita  growth  in  the
groups  of  developed,  less  developed,  and  cen-  range  of  2.5  to  3.1  percent  during  the  1980s,
trally  planned.  The  developed  or  industrial  re-  which  is  slower  than  growth  during  the  1970s,
gions  include  western  Europe,  Japan,  Oceania,  which in turn  was slower than the growth during
and North  America.  They contain  15  percent of  the  1960s.
world  population  and  60 percent  of world gross  The  world  income  elasticity  for  grain  would
national  product  (GNP).  The  centrally  planned  appear to lie  in  the range  of .2 to  .4  (Abel; U.S.
countries  include  principally  the  USSR,  China,  Department  of Agriculture  1978).  For the  U.S.
and  eastern  Europe.  They contain  30 percent of  and other industrial countries,  it is close to zero.
world population  and 20  percent  of world GNP.  As  per  capita  income  grows  in  the  rest  of the
The  developing  countries  include  the remainder  world,  the  income elasticity  of demand  for food
and  contain  55  percent  of world population  and  will  likely  decline.  Thus,  the  impact  of income
20 percent  of world  GNP.  growth upon food demand will probably lessen in
In  1978,  the  United  Nations  reassessed  and  the future.
lowered its  1973 world population growth projec-  Price  trends are more difficult  to forecast than
tion for the 1980-90 period from 1.93 percent per  either population  or income.  The  inelasticity  of
annum  to  1.80  percent  per  annum.  The  United  both grain  supply  and demand  means that small
Nation's  experts  concluded  that "the  period  of  changes inproduction will cause large changes in
the  most  rapid  growth  of  the  world  population  prices.  Frequently,  projections  are  based  upon
has already passed.  ..  .[T]he annual growth rate  the  assumption of quantity  adjustments,  but not
of  the  world  population  today  is  1.8  percent  price  adjustments  (e.g.,  see Abel).  Although  un-
which  is  below  the  highest level  of about  2 per-  derstandable in view of the limitations of interna-
cent estimated for 1960-65.  The  rate is expected  tional  price  data  and  price  elasticity  estimates,
to continue  its  decline,  . . . reaching  1.5  percent  the  omission  of price  adjustments  results  in ex-
at the end  of the century"  (p. 3).  aggerated imbalances between projected demand
World income growth is much more difficult to  and supply.
forecast  than  population  growth.  Nobel  econo-  The index of prices received  by U.S.  farmers
mist  W.  Arthur  Lewis  notes  that  "the  period  for  food  grains  deflated  by  the  consumer  price
since  the  second  world  war,  down to  1973,  has  index  (CPI)  declined  by  2.9 percent  annually  in
been  one of unprecedented  growth for the world  the  1950s,  and by 4.5 percent annually during the
economy  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  for developed  1960s,  but increased by 6.7 percent annually dur-
and developing  countries separately"  (p.  1).  But  ing  1970-1977.  During  the  past  30  years,  real
this  boom waned.  Lewis offers  six reasons why  grain  prices  in  the  world  market  fell  1 percent
the  1950-73  prosperity  may  be  special  and  not  annually  (O'Brien, p.  7).  Unit  values  of exports
repeatable  (p.  14):  (1)  the backlog  of innovations  of  major  grains  during  the  1960-72  period  de-
3This  section  draws  heavily upon a recent  paper  by Coffey  and  Capps.  For an  explanation  of the  supply and  demand  projection  equations,  see  Coffey.
32dined relative to industrial  products.  But during  cause  of new feed  additives  and  growth  stimul-
the longer period  of 1960-77,  which includes the  ants, which improve feed conversion  by  10 to  15
commodity price boom of 1973-74, unit values of  percent,  the  grain  demand  for  livestock  feed
grain  exports  increased  relative  to  industrial  could be reduced  in the U.S.  by  10 to  15  million
products  (Jabara).  These price  data  suggest that  metric tons by  1990.
real agricultural  prices for grain  declined  during  Taken together, these factors  suggest  a slower
the  1960s but rose during  the  1970s.  growth  in  world  demand  for  grains  during  the
An added impetus to grain demand may be the  1980s  than  during  the  1960s  and  1970s.  Popula-
conversion  of grains  to  ethanol.  Targets  set by  tion  and income  growth will  likely  be  slower.  If
the  Carter  Administration  called  for  the  1990  real  prices  rise,  demand  growth  will  be  further
gasohol use to comprise  10 percent  of U.S.  gaso-  dampened.  My  estimate  is  that,  with  constant
line consumption.  O'Brien has estimated  that an  prices, world grain consumption will grow by 2 to
upper limit of 14 to 25 million metric tons of corn  3 percent per annum,  with 2.6 percent being the
equivalent  may  be  used  annually  for  ethanol  most likely (Table  1).  This compares to a 2.4 per-
production  by  1985.  Abel  places the  upper limit  cent growth  during  the  1970s.  The  growth  rate
of grain  use  in ethanol at 20  million  metric  tons  will  be  a  slow  0.5  percent  in the  U.S.  and  1.2
by  1990.  At  these  upper limits,  total U.S.  grain  percent in developed countries,  a fast 4.2 percent
demand  would  increase  about  5  to  10  percent.  in developing countries,  and a moderate  2.4 per-
But  these  upper  limits  may  be  unrealistically  cent in centrally  planned countries.
high,  unless  the  economic  feasibility  of  grain
conversion  to ethanol improves.  A recent  study  Grain Supply
by Schruben  and Landkamer indicates that gaso-
hol  subsidies  in excess  of $10  per net  bushel  of  Future  growth  in world  grain  supply  (S*)  de-
corn  marketed  through  gasohol  would  be  re-  pends  on  the  shift  in  the  supply  function  due
quired  to  make  gasohol  production  profitable.  to  technological  improvement  or  productivity
Thus, it  does not appear that use of grain to pro-  growth (T*),  the elasticity of supply (Es),  and the
duce  gasohol  will  be  a major factor  influencing  growth in real grain prices  (P*),  that is,
U.S.  grain demand  during this  decade.
There is  the possibility  that grain demand may  S*  =  T*  +  EsP*.
be  reduced  by  the  development  of nonconven-
tional substitute sources from the ocean, synthet-  Productivity  improvements  have been  the major
ic foods derived from  oil, etc.  I am in agreement  source  of agricultural  expansion  during the  past
with  Wortman  and  Cummins  and  do  not  antici-  three  decades.  The  1.9  percent  annual  rise  in
pate a significant impact of such nonconventional  U.S. farm output,  coupled  with  a  .1  percent  an-
food  sources  as  during  the  1980s.  However,  be-  nual  decline  in  farm  inputs,  implies  an  annual
TABLE  1.  Past and Projected  World  Grain Production,  Consumption,  and Trade
Production  Consumption  Gap Between  Consump-  Equilibrium 
tion  &  Production  Trade
Projected  Projected  Projected  Projected  1990
Actual  Annual  Actual  Annual  Actual  Annual  . ....
Country  Group  1990  1990  1990  Production  Consumption  Trade 1930  Growth  1980  Growth  1980  Growth
mmt  %  mmt  mmt  %  mmt  mmt  %  mmt  mmt  mmt  mmt
Developed
U.S.  2 62 2 .5  335  176  0.5  185  -113  3.0  -150  355  181  -174
Non-U.S.  243  1.5  282  242  1.2  274  -1  23.1  -8  300  266  -34
Developing  400  1.5  464  451  4.2  683  56  14.6  219  490  650  160
Centrally  Planned  528  1.5  613  576  2.4  732  58  7.5  119  648  696  48
World  Total  1,433  1.7  1,694  1,445  2.6  1,874  0  --  180  1,793  1,793  0
a Based upon a  1.5 percent productivity  growth  and  constant real prices from  Coffey  and Capps  (p.  14).
b Based upon  a high growth  of demand with constant  real prices  from Coffey  and Capps  (p.  11).
c Assumes  a  price  elasticity  of supply  and  demand  of  0.3,  a world-wide  annual  real price  increase  of  1.5  percent,  and  a
supply-demand  growth of 2.15 percent.  Numbers  have  been adjusted  so that  total consumption equals total production.
d  The  1980 drought  cut U.S.  grain production by  35 million metric tons. The high U.S. growth rate is due to the recovery  from
the  drought.
e The  letters  mmt mean  million metric tons.
33productivity growth of 2 percent (Ruttan,  p.  18).  couraging  evidence  of the  favorable  impacts  of
World agricultural productivity rose annually  2.2  improvements  in  human  capital  upon economic
percent from  1950 to  1980  (O'Brien,  p.  19).  The  progress.  Thus,  human  capital  improvements
rate  was  2.1  percent  in  developed  countries,  2  may become a significant contributor to produc-
percent  in developing countries,  and 2.8  percent  tivity  growth and  partially  offset the adverse  ef-
in  centrally  planned countries.  fects of land,  energy,  and research funding scar-
The National Academy of Sciences concluded,  city.  Current  headlines  suggest that  major  pro-
"Recent  trends  in  U.S.  productivity  relative  to,  ductivity increases  may be forthcoming from ge-
several crop and livestock products are sufficient  netic engineering.
to  cause  us  to  view  the  situation  as  we  would  Grain  supply  elasticity  estimates  span  a  wide
clouds on  a far horizon.  Perhaps  the clouds  will  range. Peterson estimated  the long-run aggregate
grow into a storm; perhaps not"  (p.  189).  Vernon  agricultural  supply  elasticity  for  developing
Ruttan,  after reviewing  the  U.S.  data,  recently  countries  in the  range  of  1.25  to  1.66,  which  he
stated,  "It  is difficult  to avoid  a conclusion that  observes  is  8 to  10 times greater than the widely
the  lag  in  research  funding  during  the  1965-80  accepted  .15 level.  (Grain supply should be even
period will be followed by further decline in total  more elastic  than aggregate  agricultural  supply.)
productivity  growth  during  the  1980-2000  The U.S. Department of Agriculture  (1971,  1978)
period.  ...  [E]ven  a  substantial  effort  . . . will  suggests  a .3-  to .5-range  for grain  supply elastic-
have great  difficulty  pushing  the rate  of produc-  ity.  Given a supply of .4,  rising real grain  prices
tivity growth much above  1.5% per year" (p.  36).  of  3 to  4  percent  would  result  in  a production
From  1972  to  1980,  world  agricultural produc-  increase  equivalent  to  one-half of the  historical
tivity growth rates dropped by about 0.5 percent-  production growth rate.
age points.  There is  concern that the world pro-  I have  projected  1990  grain  production  at the
ductivity  growth  rate  will  decline further.  Most  conservative  1.5-percent  growth  rate,  with  an
of  the  productive  farmland  has  already  been  upward  adjustment  of 35  million  metric  tons  to
brought  under  cultivation.  Additions  to  future  offset  the  1980  U.S.  drought  (Table  1).  These
production  will have to  come  primarily from ex-  conservative  projections  of  production,  when
panded  yields  arising  from  increased  fertilizer  coupled  with the  optimistic  levels  of consump-
and pesticides,  improved  varieties,  or irrigation.  tion,  imply a doubling of imports by the centrally
However,  the costs  of these  inputs  are sensitive  planned  countries  and  a  quadrupling  of imports
to rising energy prices. Thus, rising energy prices  by  the  developing  countries  by  1990.  We  will
may dampen  future productivity  growth.  now examine  import projections  in more detail.
The significance  of rising energy prices  can be
illustrated  by  using  the  framework  of Debertin  Grain Trade and Interdependency
and  Pagoulatos,  which  relates  aggregate  U.S.
crop  supply response to real energy prices.  Dur-  Grain  trade  growth  depends  upon  production
ing the  1960s, U.S.  crop production increased by  and consumption  growth and the extent to which
7.5  percent,  while real gasoline prices  decreased  governments permit  mports and exports to cush-
by  14 percent.  Given  a cross  elasticity  between  th  t  aout oetimarket  ar  eeat  veia  rai  trae is
crop supply and energy price of -. 25, almost half  tat abue one-irdets  of intrnationa  rrs  in  traei
of the  crop  production  expansion  during  the  in  puc  in open  markets,  ands  two-thirds  is pried
1960s  in  the  U.S.  could  be attributed  to  the de-  in  public  and  private  tenders  and/or  negotiated 1960s  in the  U.S.  could  be  attributed  to the  de-
dine  in real energy  prices.4 On  the  other hand,  trades with  centrall  l
from  1970-79,  the  44-percent  increase  in  crop  Governments  are  directly  involved in  90 percent
output and the 60-percent  increase in real energy  of world  grain  trade  as buyers andor  sellers  Of
prices  imply  that the  real  energy  price  increase  course, the fact that a majority  of grain sales  in-
reduced  the  expantsion  of  crop  output  by  ones-  volves governmental negotiations  does not mean
,fourth.5 that market forces are inoperative.  No one would
There  are  some  encouraging  signs  of  future  accuse  the  Soviets  of  ignoring  prices  in  their There  are  some  encouraging  signs  of  future
productivity growth. Earl Swanson found little, if  grain purchase  decisions.
any,  support  for  the  hypotheses  that  U.S.  ag-  Grain trade growth  is  also influenced  by inter-
ricultural  productivity  growth  has  slowed  in  the  national  economic  interdependencies,  which  in
1970s.  T. W.  Schultz has observed "that popula-  turn  affect  economic  growth.  Dornbusch  indi-
tion quality matters and that a goodly number of  cates  that,  due  to  trade  interdependencies,  a
low-income  countries have a strong positive rec-  1-percent  simultaneous  increase  in  autonomous
ord  in  improving  this  quality.  These  achieve-  spending  in all the OECD countries  will increase
ments imply favorable  economic prospects, pro-  GNP in  the  U.S.  by  1.8  percent  (pp.  51,  52).  In
vided they are not dissipated by political instabil-  the reverse  direction,  a  1.5-percent  expansion of
ity."  The  World  Bank  also has  found  some  en-  the  U.S.  will  spill  over,  resulting  in  an income
4
The crop supply growth function  is Q  = EP  +  EP,  where Q  is the growth in  crop output,  Es is the elasticity  of crop  supply,  P  is index of crop prices, E,  is the cross
elasticity  of supply  with  respect  to energy  prices,  and  Pe  is the growth  in  energy  prices.  EP:e  =  (-.25)(14)  =  3.5 percent,  or  almost  half of the 7.5-percent  increase.
'In  this  case, EP,.  = (-.25)(60)  =  15 percent,  or one-fourth  of 44 percent  plus  15 percent.
34rise  in  Germany  by 0.2  percent,  in  Japan  by  0.3  times faster than the  domestic consumption  and
percent,  and  Canada  by 0.7 percent.  W.  Arthur  the dependence  upon  international grain markets
Lewis  points  out that the  remarkable  economic  will rise. If U.S.  grain exports do  not expand by
growth  of the  developing  countries  during  the  at  least  3  percent  annually,  surplus  grain-
past two decades has to a significant degree been  producing  capacity may  emerge  in the  U.S.
possible  because  of  the  expanded  demand  for  4.  The  U.S.  share  of world grain  exports may
their  raw  material  exports  arising  from  the  rise, but the U.S.  share of world grain production
growth of the developed countries.  Lewis stress-  will  stabilize or decline.  The U.S.  will not likely
es  that  contrary  to  much  of the rhetoric,  future  have  sufficient  leverage to exercise  food power.
growth  in the  industrial  world  will  not be  at the  5.  Finally,  world  grain  markets  might  not
expense of Third World  growth; rather,  it will be  boom  as  much  during  the  1980s  as  during  the
necessary  to their growth.  1970s  because  of  slower  population  and  per
John  Mellor  emphasizes  the  relatively  stable  capita income  growth.
relationship  between  growth  in the  demand  for
and the supply  of food in  the early  stages  of de-
velopment:  "The  possibility  of a 'gap'  between  IMPLICATIONS  AND  CONCLUSIONS
supply  and  demand  increases  with  progress  of
the  economic  transformation  and  development  Events  of the  past  decade  have  suggested  to
and  since  the  price  elasticity  of demand  is  also  some  an expanded  role  of food power  in  the in-
decreasing,  the  possibility  of  major  price  in-  ternational  diplomatic,  military,  and  economic
creases or the necessity for food imports appears  affairs of the U.S.  It has been especially  tempting
somewhat  greater for the medium-income  coun-  for  those of us  associated  with U.S.  agriculture
tries  than  for  the  very  low-income  countries"  to  climb  aboard  this  bandwagon  and  proclaim  a
(p.  78,  79).  Mellor's  insight  casts  the  trends  of  larger  role  for  agriculture.  I  will  summarize  the
increased  grain  imports  of the developing  coun-  factors  that point to both for and against a larger
tries  and  rising  world  grain  prices  in  a  different  role.
light.  It  may  be  attributed,  at  least partially,  to  The  following  factors  point to  a growing U.S.
economic  success rather than to agricultural fail-  influence  in  food  and  diplomatic  affairs  and/or
ure.  tightening  world  food  markets,  and  hence  to an
In  view  of  these  interdependencies  between  expanded  role  of food  in international  affairs  of
the  East  and  the  West,  between  the  North  and  the U.S.:
the South, between agriculture and the rest of the
economy,  and between  world prices and domes-  1. Rising  food  trade  and  growing  interdepen-
tic prices,  we would expect more convergence  of  dencies  between  East  and  West,  North  and
grain  production  and  consumption  growth  rates  South.
and the growth rates of exports and imports than  2.  Apparent willingness  of the U.S. to use em-
the  180 million  metric ton  gap projected,  assum-  bargoes for both foreign and  domestic reasons.
ing  slow production  and optimistic  consumption  3.  Proliferation  of world  food  organizations,
growth.  In fact,  an annual  real price  increase  of  conferences,  and conventions.
1.6  percent  would  be  sufficient  to  equalize  the  4.  Concern  about  slower  world  food  produc-
projected world grain  supply and demand growth  tion growth  due to  scarcity  of new  land suitable
at  2.15  percent,  provided  world  markets  were  for agricultural  production  and  reduced  agricul-
closely  linked,  that  is,  if  the  elasticity  of price  tural productivity  growth.
transmission  is  close  to  1.  5.  Increasing  absolute  numbers  of  malnour-
I interpret the world  production,  consumption  ished people  and deepening  grain  deficits  in  the
and trade  projections  in Table  1 as  follows:  developing countries.
6.  The  emergence  of  the  Soviet  Union  and
1. Under  conservative  productivity  and  op-  China  as major agricultural  importers  and hence
timistic  consumption  assumptions,  1990  com-  as  potential targets for food power.
bined  grain  deficits  of  the  developing  and  cen-  7.  The  continuing  energy  crisis,  which  raises
trally  planned  countries  would  be  338  million  production  costs  and  creates  a  new  demand  of
metric tons, compared  to  114 million metric tons  grain for use in  gasohol.
in  1980.  Still,  the  U.S.  could  fill  this  deficit  if  8.  Increased  bilateralism,  segmentation,  and,
exports  grow in the  1980s  at the  11-percent  rate  hence,  instability  of grain  trade.
they grew during  the  1970s.  9.  Success of OPEC oil cartel,  thus encourag-
2.  With more  favorable productivity  increases  ing  the creation of food  cartels.
and/or  a  modest  l-to-2-percent  real  grain  price  The  following  factors  point  to a waning  influ-
increase,  world  grain  production  in  1990  would  ence  of the  U.S.  in international  relations  and  a
be  an estimated  1,793 million metric tons.  World  shrinking  share  of  agriculture,  and,  thus,  a  re-
exports would  be 208 million metric tons, or 11.6  duced  role  of food  in international  affairs  of the
percent of world production.  U.S.:
3.  U.S.  grain  exports  will  grow  five or  more  1.  Slowed  world  food  demand  growth  due  to
35reduced population and income growth prospects  the continued  decline  in the  share of agriculture
in the  1980s.  in the world  economy,  and  the tarnished  record
2.  The increasing wave of protectionism to re-  of previous uses of food diplomacy. I hope that a
duce domestic reliance  on food imports.  lessened role is the case, because  it will be possi-
3.  The  depletion of foreign exchange  earnings  ble  to  the  extent  that  agricultural  and  general
in oil-importing  countries, which may necessitate  economic progress occurs, international tensions
further cutbacks  in food  imports.  diminish, and international cooperation expands.
4.  Growing disenchantment  with food aid pro-  My conclusion is paradoxical:  U.S. agriculture
grams,  both from the  perspectives  of the  donor  will have  a diminished role  in international af-
and the recipient.  fairs,  but  international  affairs will have  an  in-
5.  Diplomatic  sensitivity  to  use  of food  as  a  creased  impact on U.S. agriculture. U.S.  domes-
weapon  or tool.  tic  food  demand  will  grow  very  slowly  in  the
6.  Shrinking  share  of world  agriculture  as  a  1980s.  Hence,  a vigorous U.S. agriculture will be
percent  of  GNP,  population,  trade,  and  con-  dependent upon exporting a larger share of prod-
sumer expenditures.  uction.  This  means  assuring food  importing na-
7.  Declining  international  influence  and,  tions that they can depend upon our food exports
hence,  the  ability of the U.S.  to bring about lib-  and  signaling  food exporting  nations  that we in-
eral trade terms for agricultural  products.  tend  to  compete  for world  markets.  The  use  of
8.  The possibility  of breakthroughs  in agricul-  food as  an economic weapon  in international  af-
tural  technology  or  the  improvements  arising  fairs jeopardizes U.S. credibility  as a dependable
from  increased  human  capital that would  accel-  supplier and as a vigorous competitor.  It prompts
erate  food supply  growth.  the  USSR,  Japan,  and  other  importers  to  con-
9.  The  apparent  minor  adverse  impact on the  tract  with  alternative  suppliers.  It  prompts
Soviets  of the recent grain  embargo,  despite the  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  other  food  exporters  to
favorable  circumstances  of  reduced  world  expand  production  and  compete  with  the  U.S.
supplies,  record  Soviet  import  intentions,  and  for the Soviet,  Japanese,  and  other markets.  Do
two successive  poor Soviet  harvests,  you  expect  the  Soviet  Union ever  again  to  be-
On balance,  I am inclined to the view of a less-  come  so dependent upon U.S.  grain? Do you ex-
ened  rather  than  an  expanded  role  for  food,  pect Argentina to forfeit its new grain agreement
largely  because  of the  limited  leverage  of food,  with the Soviet  Union?  I do not.
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